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SHARP BENEFIT-TO-COST RULES FOR THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION ON REGULAR GRAPHS
By Yu-Ting Chen
University of British Columbia
We study two of the simple rules on finite graphs under the death–
birth updating and the imitation updating discovered by Ohtsuki,
Hauert, Lieberman and Nowak [Nature 441 (2006) 502–505]. Each
rule specifies a payoff-ratio cutoff point for the magnitude of fixa-
tion probabilities of the underlying evolutionary game between co-
operators and defectors. We view the Markov chains associated with
the two updating mechanisms as voter model perturbations. Then
we present a first-order approximation for fixation probabilities of
general voter model perturbations on finite graphs subject to small
perturbation in terms of the voter model fixation probabilities. In
the context of regular graphs, we obtain algebraically explicit first-
order approximations for the fixation probabilities of cooperators dis-
tributed as certain uniform distributions. These approximations lead
to a rigorous proof that both of the rules of Ohtsuki et al. are valid
and are sharp.
1. Introduction. The main objective of this paper is to investigate the
simple rules for the evolution of cooperation by clever, but nonrigorous, ar-
guments of pair-approximation on certain large graphs in Ohtsuki, Hauert,
Lieberman and Nowak [18]. For convenience, we name these rules and their
relatives comprehensively as benefit-to-cost rules (abbreviated as b/c rules)
for reasons which will become clear later on. The work [18] takes spatial
structure into consideration and gives an explanation with analytical crite-
ria for the ubiquity of cooperative entities observed in biological systems and
human societies. (See also the references in [18] for other models on struc-
tured populations.) In particular, this provides a way to overcome one of
the major difficulties in theoretical biology since Darwin. (See Hamilton [8],
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Axelrod and Hamilton [3], Chapter 13 in Maynard Smith [14] and many
others.)
We start by describing the evolutionary games defined in [18] and set some
definitions. Consider a finite, connected, and simple (i.e., undirected and
without loops or parallel edges) graph G= (V,E) on N vertices. (See, e.g., [4]
for the standard terminology of graph theory.) Imagine the graph as a social
network where a population of N individuals occupy the vertices of G and
the edges denote the links between the individuals. The population consists
of cooperators and defectors labeled by 1’s and 0’s, respectively. Their fitness
is described through payoffs from encounters as follows. Consider a 2 × 2
payoff matrix
Π=
(
Π11 Π10
Π01 Π00
)
=
(
b− c −c
b 0
)
.(1.1)
Here, while positive constants are natural candidates for both benefit b and
cost c, we allow arbitrary reals for their possible values unless otherwise
mentioned. Each entry Πij of Π denotes the payoff that an i-player receives
from a j-player. Hence, the payoff of a cooperator is bn − ck if n of its k
neighbors are cooperators, and the payoff of a defector is bm if m of its
neighbors are cooperators. Then the fitness of an individual located at x
is given by a convex combination of the baseline fitness with weight 1−w
and its payoff with weight w. The baseline fitness is normalized to 1 for
convenience. The parameter w is interpreted as the intensity of selection.
Therefore, weak selection means that payoff is a small proportion of fitness
compared to the baseline fitness.
In contrast to game theory where strategies are decided by rational play-
ers, evolutionary game theory considers the random evolution of interacting
players in which the “fitter” strategies have better chances to replicate. We
study two of the updating mechanisms under weak selection in [18] for the
evolution of cooperation throughout our work. Under the death–birth up-
dating, we kill a random individual and then let its neighbors compete for
the vacant vertex with success probability proportional to the fitness of its
neighbors. Under the imitation updating, a random individual updates its
strategy, but now it will either adhere to its original strategy or imitate one
of the neighbors’ strategies with success probability proportional to fitness.
In this way, each updating mechanism defines a Markov chain on configu-
rations consisting of 1’s and 0’s, or more specifically, a spin system in the
sense of Liggett [11] where each vertex can adopt only two possible opin-
ions, 1 and 0. Despite the simplicity of the transition rates, the readers may
observe that the spin systems pose certain difficulty in terms of the classical
approaches in interacting particle systems. For example, as a result of the
asymmetry of payoffs, there is no symmetry between 1’s and 0’s in the two
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spin systems. In addition, it is not hard to see that in general the two spin
systems are not attractive.
We are now ready to describe the b/c rules for the two evolutionary games
which are surprisingly simple criterions for criticality in the asymptotic. The
degree of a graph is defined in [18] to be the average number of neighbors
per vertex. Put a single cooperative mutant on the vertices with a random
location. Then the clever, but nonrigorous, calculations in the supplemen-
tary notes of [18], supported by several numerical simulations, lead to the
following b/c rule for the death–birth updating under weak selection on cer-
tain large graphs of degree k; selection favors cooperation whenever b/c > k
and selection opposes cooperation whenever b/c < k. Here, selection favors
(resp., opposes) cooperation if the probability that a single cooperative mu-
tant converts the defecting population completely into a cooperative popu-
lation is strictly higher (resp., lower) than the fixation probability 1/N of
a neutral mutant. [See (2.8) for the latter probability. Equation (2.8) also
shows, in particular, that if the graph is regular, then the fixation probability
of a neutral mutant at an arbitrary location without further randomization
is precisely 1/N .] A similar b/c rule under the imitation mechanism is dis-
cussed in the supplementary notes of [18], with the modification that the
cutoff point k should be replaced by k + 2. We remark that the work [18]
also considers the birth–death updating (in contrast to the death–birth up-
dating) and its associated b/c rule. See [21] for a further study of these b/c
rules. For more b/c rules see [8, 16] and [20], to name but a few. The mono-
graph [17] gives an authoritative and excellent introduction to evolutionary
dynamics.
Lying at the heart of the work [18] to obtain selective advantage of coop-
erators is the introduction of structured populations. This is manifested by
the role of a fixed degree as population size becomes large. Consider instead
a naive model where only fractions of players in a large population are con-
cerned and the same payoff matrix (1.1) is in effect for evolutionary fitness.
The fractions zC and zD of cooperators and defectors are modeled through
replicator equations as
z˙C = zC(ρC − ρ¯),
(1.2)
z˙D = zD(ρD − ρ¯).
Here, by the equality zC + zD = 1, the payoffs for cooperators and defectors
are ρC = bzC − c and ρD = bzC , and ρ¯ is the average payoff given by zCρC +
zDρD. By (1.2), the fraction of cooperators satisfies the following logistic
differential equation:
z˙C =−czC(1− zC).
Hence, any proper fraction of cooperators must vanish eventually whenever
cost c is positive. See, for example, Chapter 7 in [10], Chapter 4 in [17]
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or Section 3 in [9] for this model and more details. As discussed in more
detail later on, a similar result holds in any unstructured population of finite
size under the death–birth updating. Informally, a spatial structure, on one
hand, promotes the formation of cliques of cooperators which collectively
have a selective advantage and, on the other hand, reduces the exploitation
of cooperators by defectors.
In [19], Ohtsuki and Nowak gave a rigorous proof of the b/c rules on large
cycles under weak selection, in particular for the two updating mechanisms.
The results in [19] exploit the fact that on cycles the fixation probabili-
ties under each updating mechanism satisfy a system of birth–death-process
type difference equations, and exact fixation probabilities can be derived
accordingly. It is easy to get the exact solvability of fixation probabilities
by the same approach on complete graphs, although on each fixed one of
these graphs cooperators are always opposed under weak selection for the
death–birth updating. (See [18] and Remark 1.1(3). Note that the degree of
a complete graph has the same order as the number of vertices.) It seems,
however, harder to obtain fixation probabilities by extending this approach
beyond cycles and complete graphs.
In this work, we will view each of the two spin systems as a voter model
perturbation on a (finite, connected and simple) graph of arbitrary size.
Voter model perturbations are studied in Cox and Perkins [7] and further
developed in generality in Cox, Durrett and Perkins [6] on transient integer
lattices Zd for d≥ 3. On the infinite lattices considered in [6] (often sharp)
conditions, based on a related reaction diffusion equation, were found to
ensure the coexistence of 1’s and 0’s, or to ensure that one type drives the
other out. In particular, a rigorous proof of the b/c rule under the death–
birth updating on these infinite graphs is obtained in [6]. Here, in the context
of finite graphs, the voter model perturbation associated with each of the
spin systems fixates in one of the the two absorbing states of all 1’s or all
0’s, and we give a first-order approximation to the fixation probabilities by
expansion. In spite of the apparent differences in the settings, there are in-
teresting links between our fixation probability expansions and the reaction
diffusion equation criteria in [6].
Let us now introduce voter model perturbations as a family of spin sys-
tems. Denote by x a vertex and by η a configuration. Let c(x, η) be the flip-
ping rate of the (nearest-neighbor) voter model at x given η. Hence, c(x, η)
is equal to the probability of drawing a neighbor of x with the opposite
opinion to that of x. Then interpreted narrowly in the context considered
in this paper, the rates of a voter model perturbation are given by
cw(x, η) = c(x, η) +wh1−η(x)(x, η) +w
2gw(x, η)≥ 0(1.3)
for a small perturbation rate w > 0. Here, h1, h0 and gw for all w small are
uniformly bounded. We refer the readers to Chapter V in [11] here and in
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the following for the classical results of voter models and to Section 1 in [6]
for a general definition of voter model perturbations on transient integer
lattices.
We discuss in more detail the aforementioned result in [6] which is closely
related to the present work. A key result in [6] states that on the integer
lattices Zd for d≥ 3, the invariant distributions of a voter model perturbation
subject to small perturbation can be determined by the reaction function
through a reaction-diffusion PDE. (See Section 1.2 in [6].) Here, the reaction
function takes the form
u 7−→ lim
s→∞
∫
D(0, η)Pµu(ξs ∈ dη), u ∈ [0,1],(1.4)
where ((ξs),Pµu) denotes the voter model starting at the Bernoulli product
measure µu with density µu(η(x) = 1) = u, and the difference kernel D is
defined by
D(x, η) = η̂(x)h1(x, η)− η(x)h0(x, η)(1.5)
with η̂(x) ≡ 1− η(x). By the duality between voter models and coalescing
random walks, the reaction function defined by (1.4) can be expressed explic-
itly as a polynomial with coefficients consisting of coalescing probabilities of
random walks.
The justification in [6] of the b/c rule for the death–birth updating on
transient integer lattices is under a slightly different definition, for the sake of
adaptation to the context of infinite graphs. Precisely, the result in [6] states
that whenever b/c > k (resp., b/c < k) and there is weak selection, given
infinitely many cooperators (resp., defectors) at the beginning, any given
finite set of vertices will become occupied by cooperators (resp., defectors)
from some time onward almost surely. Here, k refers to the degree of each
vertex in the underlying lattice and is equal to 2d on Zd. The b/c rule under
the imitation updating on the same integer lattices is verified in [5], under
the same definition in [6] except that, as pointed out in [18], the cutoff point
k needs to be replaced by k+ 2.
We now discuss our result for voter model perturbations on (finite, con-
nected and simple) graphs of arbitrary size. We first work with discrete-time
Markov chains of the voter model perturbations. We assume, in addition,
the chain starting at any arbitrary state is eventually trapped at either of
the two absorbing states, the all-1 configuration 1 and the all-0 configura-
tion 0. This is a property enjoyed by both updating mechanisms under weak
selection. We proceed analytically and decompose the transition kernel Pw
of a voter model perturbation with perturbation rate w as the sum of the
transition kernel P of the voter model and a signed kernel Kw. We apply an
elementary expansion to finite-step transitions of the Pw-chain in the spirit
of Mayer’s cluster expansion [13] in statistical mechanics. Then we show
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every linear combination of the fixation probabilities of 1 and 0 subject to
small perturbation admits an infinite series expansion closely related to the
voter model. A slight refinement of this expansion leads to our main result
for the general voter model perturbations on which our study of the b/c
rules relies.
Precisely, our main result for the voter model perturbations on finite
graphs (Theorem 3.8) can be stated as follows. Regard the voter model
perturbation with perturbation rate w as a continuous-time chain (ξs) with
rates given by (1.3). Recall by our assumption that the chain starting at any
state is eventually trapped at either of the absorbing states 1 and 0. Define
τ1 for the time to the absorbing state 1 and
H(ξ) =
∑
x∈V
H(x, ξ)pi(x)(1.6)
for any H(x, ξ). Here, pi(x) is the invariant distribution of the (nearest-
neighbor) random walk on G given by
pi(x) =
d(x)
2 ·#E(1.7)
with d(x) being the degree of x, that is, the number of neighbors of x. (See,
e.g., [1] and [12] for random walks on graphs.) Then as w −→ 0+, we have
the following approximation:
P
w(τ1 <∞) = P(τ1 <∞) +w
∫ ∞
0
E[D(ξs)]ds+O(w
2).(1.8)
Here, Pw and P (with expectation E) denote the laws of the voter model
perturbation with perturbation rate w and the voter model, respectively,
both subject to the same, but arbitrary, initial distribution, and D is the
difference kernel defined by (1.5). Moreover, the integral term on the right-
hand side of (1.8) makes sense because D(ξs) ∈ L1(dP⊗ ds).
We apply the first-order approximation (1.8) to the two evolutionary
games only on regular graphs. (A graph is a k-regular if all vertices have the
same degree k and a graph is regular if it is k-regular graph for some k.) Un-
der weak selection, the approximation (1.8) implies that we can approximate
P
w(τ1 <∞) by P(τ1 <∞) and the 0-potential of D∫ ∞
0
E[D(ξs)]ds,(1.9)
all subject to the same initial distribution. Moreover, the comparison of
P
w(τ1 <∞) for small w with P(τ1 <∞) is possible whenever the 0-potential
is nonzero, with the order determined in the obvious way. For notions to be
introduced later on, we take as initial distribution the uniform distribution
un on the set of configurations with exactly nmany 1’s, where 1≤ n≤N−1.
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Each 0-potential in (1.9) starting at un can be derived from the same 0-
potentials starting at Bernoulli product measures µu with density u ∈ [0,1].
Furthermore, each 0-potential with starting measure µu can be expressed
in terms of some (expected) coalescing times of coalescing random walks.
This is in contrast to the involvement of coalescing probabilities for the
reaction functions in the context in [6]. By resorting to a simple identity
in [1] between meeting times and hitting times of random walks, we obtain
explicit forms of the coalescing times involved. Hence, by (1.8), we obtain
the fixation probabilities explicit up to the first-order term, and the precise
result is stated as follows.
Theorem 1. Let G be any (finite, connected and simple) graph on N
vertices. Suppose in addition that G is k-regular, that is, every vertex of G
has precisely degree k. Fix 1≤ n≤N − 1 and let Pwun denote the law of the
particular evolutionary game with small intensity of selection w and initial
distribution un.
(1) Under the death–birth updating, we have
P
w
un
(τ1 <∞) = n
N
+w
[
kn(N − n)
2N(N − 1)
][(
b
k
− c
)
(N −2)+ b
(
2
k
−2
)]
+O(w2)
as w −→ 0+.
(2) Under the imitation updating, we have
P
w
un
(τ1 <∞) = n
N
+w
[
k(k+ 2)n(N − n)
2(k+ 1)N(N − 1)
]
×
[(
b
(k+ 2)
− c
)
(N − 1)− (2k+ 1)b− ck
k+2
]
+O(w2)
as w −→ 0+.
Here, in either (1) or (2), we use Landau’s notation O(w2) for a function
θ(w) such that |θ(w)| ≤Cw2 for all small w, for some constant C depending
only on the graph G and the particular updating mechanism.
Before interpreting the result of Theorem 1 in terms of evolutionary
games, we first introduce the following definition which is stronger than
that in [18]. We say selection strongly favors (resp., opposes) cooperation
if for every nontrivial n, that is, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, the following holds: The
probability that n cooperative mutants with a joint location distributed as
un converts the defecting population completely into a cooperative popula-
tion is strictly higher (resp., lower) than n/N . [Here, n/N is the fixation of
probability of n neutral mutants again by (2.8).] Under this definition, The-
orem 1 yields simple algebraic criteria for both evolutionary games stated
as follows.
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Corollary 1. Suppose again that the underlying social network is a
k-regular graph on N vertices.
(1) For the death–birth updating, if(
b
k
− c
)
(N − 2) + b
(
2
k
− 2
)
> 0 (resp., < 0),
then selection strongly favors (resp., opposes) cooperation under weak selec-
tion.
(2) For the imitation updating, if(
b
(k +2)
− c
)
(N − 1)− (2k +1)b− ck
k+ 2
> 0 (resp., < 0),
then selection strongly favors (resp., opposes) cooperation under weak selec-
tion.
Applied to cycles, the algebraic criteria in Corollary 1 under the afore-
mentioned stronger definition coincide with the algebraic criteria in [19] for
the respective updating mechanism. See also equation (3) in [21] for the
death–birth updating.
As an immediate consequence of Corollary 1, we have the following result.
Corollary 2. Fix a degree k.
(1) Consider the death–birth updating. For every fixed pair (b, c) satisfying
b/k > c (resp., b/k < c), there exists a positive integer N0 such that on any
k-regular graph G = (V,E) with #V ≥ N0, selection strongly favors (resp.,
opposes) cooperation under weak selection.
(2) Consider the imitation updating. For every fixed pair (b, c) satisfying
b/(k+2) > c [resp., b/(k+2)< c], there exists a positive integer N0 such that
on any k-regular graph G= (V,E) with #V ≥N0, selection strongly favors
(resp., opposes) cooperation under weak selection.
In this way, we rigorously prove the validity of the b/c rule in [18] under
each updating mechanism. It is in fact a universal rule valid for any non-
trivial number of cooperative mutants, and holds uniformly in the number
of vertices, for large regular graphs with a fixed degree under weak selection.
Remark 1.1. (1) Although we only consider payoff matrices of the spe-
cial form (1.1) in our work, interests in evolutionary game theory do cover
general 2×2 payoff matrices with arbitrary entries. (See, e.g., [18] and [19].)
In this case, a general 2× 2 matrix Π∗ = (Π∗ij)i,j=1,0 is taken to define pay-
offs of players with an obvious adaptation of payoffs under Π. For example,
the payoff of a cooperator is (Π∗11 − Π∗10)n + kΠ∗10 if n of its k neighbors
are cooperators. In particular, if Π∗ satisfies the equal-gains-from-switching
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condition (Nowak and Sigmund [15])
Π∗11 −Π∗10 =Π∗01 −Π∗00,(1.10)
then the results in Theorem 1, Corollaries 1 and 2 still hold for Π∗ by taking
Π in their statements to be the “adjusted” payoff matrix
Πa :=
(
Π∗11 −Π∗00 Π∗10 −Π∗00
Π∗01 −Π∗00 0
)
,(1.11)
which is of the form in (1.1). See Remark 5.1 for this reduction.
(2) We stress that when n = 1 or N − 1 and the graphs are vertex-
transitive [4] (and hence, regular) such as tori, the exact locations of mutants
become irrelevant. It follows that the randomization by un is redundant in
these cases.
(3) Let G be the complete graph on N vertices so that the spatial struc-
ture is irrelevant. Consider the death–birth updating and the “natural case”
where benefit b and cost c are both positive. With the degree k set equal to
N − 1, Theorem 1(1) gives for any 1≤ n≤N − 1 the approximation
P
w
un
(τ1 <∞) = n
N
+w
n(N − n)
2N
[
−c(N − 2)−
(
2− N
N − 1
)
b
]
+O(w2)
as w −→ 0+. Hence, cooperators are always opposed under weak selection
when N ≥ 3.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the standing
assumptions of voter model perturbations considered throughout this paper
and discuss their basic properties. The Markov chains associated with the
two updating mechanisms in particular satisfy these standing assumptions,
as stated in Propositions 2.1 and 2.2. In Section 3, we continue to work on
the general voter model perturbations. We develop an expansion argument
to obtain an infinite series expansion of fixation probabilities under small
perturbation rates (Proposition 3.2) and then refine its argument to get the
first-order approximation (1.8) (Theorem 3.8). In Section 4, we return to our
study of the two evolutionary games and give the proof of Theorem 1. The
vehicle for each explicit result is a simple identity between meeting times
and hitting times of random walks. Finally, the proofs of Propositions 2.1
and 2.2 (that both updating mechanisms define voter model perturbations
satisfying our standing assumptions) are deferred to Section 5.
2. Voter model perturbations. Recall that we consider only finite, con-
nected and simple graphs in this paper. Fix such a graph G = (V,E) on
N =#V vertices. Write x∼ y if x and y are neighbors to each other, that
is, if there is an edge of G between x and y. We put d(x) for the number of
neighbors of x.
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Introduce an auxiliary number λ ∈ (0,1]. Take a nearest-neighbor discrete-
time voter model with transition probabilities
P (η, ηx) =
λ
N
c(x, η), x ∈ V,
(2.1)
P (η, η) = 1− λ
N
∑
x
c(x, η).
Here, ηx is the configuration obtained from η by giving up the opinion of η
at x for
η̂(x) := 1− η(x)
and holding the opinions at other vertices fixed and we set
c(x, η) =
#{y ∼ x;η(y) = η̂(x)}
d(x)
.
We now define the discrete-time voter model perturbations considered
throughout this paper as follows. Suppose that we are given functions hi
and gw and a constant w0 ∈ (0,1) satisfying
sup
w∈[0,w0],x,η
(|h1(x, η)|+ |h0(x, η)|+ |gw(x, η)|)≤C0 <∞.(A.1)
cw(x, η) := c(x, η) +wh1−η(x)(x, η) +w
2gw(x, η)≥ 0,(A.2)
cw(x,1) = cw(x,0)≡ 0 for each x ∈ V(A.3)
for each w ∈ [0,w0]. Here, 1 and 0 denote the all-1 configuration and the all-0
configuration, respectively. In (A.2), we set up a basic perturbation of voter
model rates up to the second order. In terms of the voter model perturbations
defined below by cw(x, η), we will be able to control the higher order terms
in an expansion of fixation probabilities with the uniform bound imposed
in (A.1). The assumption (A.3) ensures that the voter model perturbations
have the same absorbing states 1 and 0 as the previously defined voter
model.
Under the assumptions (A.1)–(A.3), we define for each perturbation rate
w ∈ [0,w0] a voter model perturbation with transition probabilities
Pw(η, ηx) =
λ
N
cw(x, η), x ∈ V,
(2.2)
Pw(η, η) = 1−
∑
x
λ
N
cw(x, η).
[Here we assume without loss of generality by (A.1) that each Pw(η, ·) is
truly a probability measure, in part explaining the need of the auxiliary
number λ.] In particular P 0 ≡ P .
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Notation. We shall write Pwν for the law of the voter model perturba-
tion with perturbation rate w and initial distribution ν and set Pν := P
0
ν . In
particular we put Pwη := P
w
δη
and Pη := Pδη , where δη is the Dirac measure
at η. The discrete-time and continuous-time coordinate processes on {1,0}V
are denoted by (ξn;n ≥ 0) and (ξs; s ≥ 0), respectively. Here, and in what
follows, we abuse notation to read “n” and other indices for the discrete
time scale and “s” for the continuous time scale whenever there is no risk
of confusion.
Our last assumption, which is obviously satisfied by the P -voter model
thanks to the connectivity of G, is
P
w
η (ξn ∈ {1,0} for some n)> 0 for every η ∈ {1,0}V(A.4)
for each w ∈ (0,w0]. Since 1 and 0 are absorbing by the condition (A.3),
it follows from the Markov property that the condition (A.4) is equivalent
to the condition that the limiting state exists and can only be either of the
absorbing states 1 and 0 under Pw for any w ∈ (0,w0].
Proposition 2.1 ([6]). Suppose that the graph is k-regular. Then the
Markov chain associated with the death–birth updating with small intensity of
selection w is a voter model perturbation with perturbation rate w satisfying
(A.1)–(A.4) with λ= 1 and
h1 =−(b+ c)kf0f1 + kbf00 + kf0(bf11 − bf00),
(2.3)
h0 =−h1.
Here,
fi(x, η) =
1
k
#{y;y ∼ x, η(y) = i},
(2.4)
fij(x, η) =
1
k2
#{(y, z);x∼ y ∼ z, η(y) = i, η(z) = j}.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that the graph is k-regular. Then the Markov
chain associated with the imitation updating with small intensity of selection
w is a voter model perturbation with perturbation rate w satisfying (A.1)–
(A.4) with λ= k
k+1 and
h1 = k[(b− c)f11 − cf10]− k
2
k+1
f1[(b− c)f11 − cf10 + bf01]
− k
k+ 1
bf21 ,
(2.5)
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h0 = kbf01 − k
2
k+1
f0[(b− c)f11 − cf10 + bf01]
− k
k+ 1
f0[(b− c)f1 − cf0],
where fi and fij are as in (2.4).
The proofs of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 are deferred to Section 5.
The assumptions (A.1)–(A.4) are in force from now on.
Let us consider some basic properties of the previously defined discrete-
time chains. First, as has been observed, we know that
1 = Pw(τ1 ∧ τ0 <∞) = Pw(τ1 <∞) + Pw(τ0 <∞),
where we write τη for the first hitting time of η. Observe that P
w(τ1 <∞)
is independent of the auxiliary number λ > 0. Indeed, the holding time of
each configuration η 6= 1,0 is finite and the probability of transition from η
to ηx at the end of the holding time is given by
cw(x, η)∑
y∈V c
w(y, η)
,
which is independent of λ > 0.
We can estimate the equilibrium probability Pw(τ1 <∞) by a “harmonic
sampler” of the voter model from finite time. Let p1(ξ) be the weighted
average of 1’s in the vertex set
p1(η) =
∑
x
η(x)pi(x),(2.6)
where pi(x) is the invariant distribution of the (nearest-neighbor) random
walk on G and is given by (1.7). Since p1(1) = 1− p1(0) = 1 and the chain
is eventually trapped at 1 or 0, it follows from dominated convergence that
lim
n→∞
E
w[p1(ξn)] = P
w(τ1 <∞).(2.7)
On the other hand, the function p1 is harmonic for the voter model
Eη[p1(ξ1)] = p1(η) +
λ
N · 2#E
×
( ∑
η(x)=0
#{y ∼ x;η(y) = 1} −
∑
η(x)=1
#{y ∼ x;η(y) = 0}
)
= p1(η).
In particular, (2.7) applied to w = 0 entails
Pη(τ1 <∞) = p1(η) =
∑
η(x)=1 d(x)
2 ·#E ,(2.8)
where the last equality follows from the explicit form (1.7) of pi.
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Remark 2.3. Since every harmonic function f for the voter model sat-
isfies
f(η)≡ Eη[f(ξτ1∧τ0)],
(2.8) implies that the vector space of harmonic functions is explicitly char-
acterized as the span of the constant function 1 and p1. Recall also the
foregoing display gives a construction of any harmonic function with preas-
signed values at 1 and 0. (See, e.g., Chapter 2 in [1].)
3. Expansion. We continue to study the discrete-time voter model per-
turbations defined in Section 2. For each w ∈ [0,w0], consider the signed
kernel
Kw = Pw −P,
which measures the magnitude of perturbations of transition probabilities.
We also define a nonnegative kernel |Kw| by |Kw|(η, η˜) = |Kw(η, η˜)|.
Lemma 3.1. For any w ∈ [0,w0] and any f :{1,0}V −→R, we have
Kwf(η) =
λ
N
∑
x
[wh1−η(x)(x, η) +w
2gw(x, η)][f(η
x)− f(η)](3.1)
and
‖|Kw|f‖∞ ≤ 4C0w‖f‖∞,(3.2)
where C0 is the constant in (A1).
Proof. We notice that for any η and any x,
Kw(η, ηx) =
λ
N
[wh1−η(x)(x, η) +w
2gw(x, η)],
Kw(η, η) =−
∑
x
λ
N
[wh1−η(x)(x, η) +w
2gw(x, η)],
by the definitions of cw and Pw. Our assertions (3.1) and (3.2) then follow
at one stroke. 
Using the signed kernel Kw, we can rewrite every T -step transition prob-
ability PwT of the voter model perturbation as
PwT (η0, ηT ) =
∑
η1,...,ηT−1
Pw(η0, η1)P
w(η1, η2) · · ·Pw(ηT−1, ηT )
=
∑
η1,...,ηT−1
(P +Kw)(η0, η1) · · · (P +Kw)(ηT−1, ηT )(3.3)
= PT (η0, ηT ) +
T∑
n=1
∑
j∈IT (n)
∑
η1,...,ηT−1
∆w,jT (η0, . . . , ηT ).
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Here, IT (n) is the set of strictly increasing n-tuples with entries in {1, . . . , T},
and for j= (j1, . . . , jn) ∈ IT (n)
∆w,jT (η0, . . . , ηT )(3.4)
is the signed measure of the path (η0, η1, . . . , ηT ) such that the transition
from ηr to ηr+1 is determined by K
w(ηr, ηr+1) if r+1 is one of the (integer-
valued) indices in j and is determined by P (ηr, ηr+1) otherwise. For conve-
nience, we set for each j ∈ IT (n)
Qw,jT (η0, ηT ) =
∑
η1,...,ηT−1
∆w,jT (η0, . . . , ηT )
as the T -step transition signed kernel, and we say Qw,jT has n faults (up
to time T ) and j is its fault sequence. Then by (3.3), we can write for any
f :{1,0}V −→R,
E
w
η0
[f(ξT )] = Eη0 [f(ξT )] +
T∑
n=1
∑
j∈IT (n)
∑
η1,...,ηT
∆w,jT (η0, . . . , ηT )f(ηT )
(3.5)
= Eη0 [f(ξT )] +
T∑
n=1
∑
j∈IT (n)
Qw,jT f(η0).
Write I(n)≡ I∞(n) for the set of strictly increasing n-tuples with entries
in N. We now state the key result which in particular offers an expansion of
fixation probabilities.
Proposition 3.2. Recall the parameter w0 > 0 in the definition of the
voter model perturbations. There exists w1 ∈ (0,w0] such that for any har-
monic function f for the voter model,
f(1)Pwη (τ1 <∞) + f(0)Pwη (τ0 <∞) = f(η) +
∞∑
n=1
∑
j∈I(n)
Qw,jjn f(η),(3.6)
where the series converges absolutely and uniformly in w ∈ [0,w1] and in
η ∈ {1,0}V.
Remark 3.3. (i) There are alternative perspectives to state the conclu-
sion of Proposition 3.2. Thanks to Remark 2.3 and the fact Qw,jT 1 ≡ 0, it
is equivalent to the validity of the same expansion for p1 defined in (2.6)
(for any small w). By Remark 2.3 again, it is also equivalent to an analo-
gous expansion of any linear combination of the two fixation probabilities
under Pw.
(ii) The series expansion (3.6) has the flavor of a Taylor series expansion
in w, as hinted by Lemma 3.6.
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The proof of Proposition 3.2 is obtained by passing T to infinity for both
sides of (3.5). This immediately gives the left-hand side of (3.6) thanks to our
assumption (A.4). There are, however, two technical issues when we handle
the right-hand sides of (3.5). The first one is minor and is the dependence on
T of the summands Qw,jT f(η0). For this, the harmonicity of f implies that
such dependence does not exist, as asserted in Lemma 3.4. As a result, the
remaining problem is the absolute convergence of the series on the right-
hand side of (3.6) for any small parameter w > 0. This is resolved by a series
of estimates in Lemmas 3.5, 3.6 and finally Lemma 3.7.
Lemma 3.4. For any harmonic function f for the voter model, any T ≥
1, and any j ∈ IT (n),
Qw,jT f(η0)≡Qw,jjn f(η0),
where we identify j∈ Ijn(n) in the natural way.
Proof. This follows immediately from the martingale property of a
harmonic function f for the voter model and the definition of the signed
measures ∆w,jT in (3.4). 
Lemma 3.5. There exist C1 =C1(G)≥ 1 and δ = δ(G) ∈ (0,1) such that
sup
η 6=1,0
Pη(ξn 6= 1,0)≤C1δn for any n≥ 1.(3.7)
Proof. Recall that the voter model starting at any arbitrary state is
eventually trapped at either 1 or 0. By identifying 1 and 0, we deduce (3.7)
from some standard results of nonnegative matrices, for suitable constants
C1 = C1(G) ≥ 1 and δ ∈ (0,1). (See, e.g., [2], Lemma I.6.1 and Proposi-
tion I.6.3.) 
Lemma 3.6. Let C1 =C1(G) and δ = δ(G) be the constants in Lemma 3.5,
and set C = C(G,C0) = max(4C0,C1). Then for any j ∈ I(n), any w ∈
[0,w0] and any harmonic function f for the voter model,
‖Qw,jjn f‖∞ ≤ ‖f‖∞wnC2nδjn−n.(3.8)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume ‖f‖∞ = 1. By defi-
nition,
Qw,jjn f(η0) =
∑
η1,...,ηjn
∆w,jjn (η0, . . . , ηjn)f(ηjn).(3.9)
If ∆w,jjn (η0, . . . , ηjn) is nonzero, then none of the η0, . . . , ηjn−1 is 1 or 0. Indeed,
if some of the ηi, 0≤ i≤ jn−1, is 1, then ηi+1, . . . , ηjn can only be 1 by (A.3)
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and therefore Kwf(ηjn−1) = 0. This is a contradiction. Similarly, we cannot
have ηi = 0 for some 0 ≤ i ≤ jn − 1. Hence, the nonvanishing summands
of the right-hand side of (3.9) range over ∆w,jjn (η1, . . . , ηjn)f(ηjn) for which
none of the ηj1 , . . . , ηjn−1 is 1 or 0. With η0 fixed, write ∆
w,j′
U,η0
for the signed
measure ∆w,j
′
U restricted to paths starting at η0. Thus we get from (3.9) that
Qw,jjn f(η0) = ∆
w,j
jn,η0
[f(ξjn)1[ξ1,...,ξjn−1 6=1,0]].
Here, our usage of the compact notation on the right-hand side is analogous
to the convention in the modern theory of stochastic processes. Recall that
|Kw| stands for the kernel |Kw|(η, η˜) = |Kw(η, η˜)|, and put |∆|w,j′η0,U for the
measure on paths (η0, . . . , ηU ) obtained by replacing all the K
w in ∆w,j
′
U,η0
by
|Kw|. Since ‖f‖∞ = 1, the foregoing display implies
|Qw,jjn f(η0)| ≤ |∆|
w,j
jn,η0
(ξ1, . . . , ξjn−1 6= 1,0)
≤ |∆|w,(j1,...,jn−1)jn−1,η0 (ξ1, . . . , ξjn−1−1 6= 1,0)
×
(
sup
η 6=1,0
Pη(ξjn−jn−1−1 6= 1,0)
)
‖|Kw|1‖∞
with j0 = 0, where supη 6=1,0 Pη(ξjn−jn−1−1 6= 1,0) bounds the measure of the
yet “active” paths from jn−1 to jn − 1 and ‖|Kw|1‖∞ bounds the measure
of the transition from jn − 1 to jn. Iterating the last inequality, we get
|Qw,jjn f(η0)| ≤ ‖|Kw|1‖n∞
n∏
r=1
(
sup
η 6=1,0
Pη(ξjr−jr−1−1 6= 1,0)
)
(3.10)
≤ (4C0)nwn
n∏
r=1
(
sup
η 6=1,0
Pη(ξjr−jr−1−1 6= 1,0)
)
,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.1. Since
∑n
r=1(jr − jr−1 −
1) = jn − n and C = max(4C0,C1), Lemma 3.5 applied to the right-hand
side of (3.10) gives
|Qw,jjn f(η0)| ≤wn(C2)nδjn−n.(3.11)
The proof of (3.8) is complete. 
Lemma 3.7. Recall the constants C = C(G,C0) and δ = δ(G) in Lem-
mas 3.6 and 3.5, respectively. There exists w1 ∈ (0,w0] such that
∞∑
n=1
∑
j∈I(n)
wn1 (C
2)nδjn−n <∞.(3.12)
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Proof. Observe that every index in
⋃∞
n=1 I(n) can be identified uniquely
by the time of the last fault and the fault sequence before the time of the last
fault. Hence, letting S denote the time of the last fault and m the number
of faults within {1, . . . , S − 1}, we can write for any w > 0
∞∑
n=1
∑
j∈I(n)
wn(C2)nδjn−n =
∞∑
S=1
S−1∑
m=0
(
S − 1
m
)
wm+1(C2)m+1δS−m−1.(3.13)
For each S, write
S−1∑
m=0
(
S − 1
m
)
wm+1(C2)m+1δS−m−1 =wC2δS−1(1 +wC2δ−1)S−1.(3.14)
With δ ∈ (0,1) fixed, we can choose w1 ∈ (0,w0] small such that
C2(1 +w1C
2δ−1)S−1 ≤
(
1√
δ
)S−1
for any large S. Apply the foregoing inequality for large S to the right-hand
side of (3.14) with w replaced by w1. This gives
S−1∑
m=0
(
S − 1
m
)
wm+11 (C
2)m+1δS−m−1 ≤w1(
√
δ)S−1,
where the right-hand side converges exponentially fast to 0 as δ < 1. By
(3.13), the asserted convergence of the series in (3.12) now follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We pick w1 as in the statement of Lem-
ma 3.7. By Lemma 3.6 and the choice of w1, the series in (3.6) converges
absolutely and uniformly in w ∈ [0,w1] and η ∈ {1,0}V.
By (3.5) and dominated convergence, it remains to show that
lim
T→∞
T∑
n=1
∑
j∈IT (n)
Qw,jT f(η0) =
∞∑
n=1
∑
j∈I(n)
Qw,jjn f(η0).
To see this, note that by Lemma 3.4, we can write
T∑
n=1
∑
j∈IT (n)
Qw,jT f(η0) =
T∑
n=1
∑
j∈I(n)
jn≤T
Qw,jjn f(η0),
where the right-hand side is a partial sum of the infinite series in (3.6). The
validity of (3.6) now follows from the absolute convergence of the series in
the same display. The proof is complete. 
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For the convenience of subsequent applications, we consider from now on
the continuous-time Markov chain (ξs) with rates given by (A.2). We can
define this chain (ξs) from the discrete-time Markov chain (ξn) by
ξs = ξMs ,
where (Ms) is an independent Poisson process with E[Ms] =
sN
λ
. (Recall
our time scale convention: “n” for the discrete time scale and “s” for the
continuous time scale.) Under this setup, the potential measure of (ξs) and
the potential measure of (ξn) are linked by
E
[∫ ∞
0
f(ξs)ds
]
=
λ
N
E
[
∞∑
n=0
f(ξn)
]
(3.15)
for any nonnegative f . In addition, the fixation probability to 1 for this
continuous-time Markov chain (ξs) is the same as that for the discrete-time
chain (ξn). (See the discussion after Proposition 2.2.)
We now state a first-order approximation of Pw(τ1 <∞) by the voter
model. Recall the difference kernel D defined by (1.5) with hi as in (A.1)
and the pi-expectation D defined by (1.6).
Theorem 3.8. Let ν be an arbitrary distribution on {1,0}V. Then as
w −→ 0+, we have
P
w
ν (τ1 <∞) = Pν(τ1 <∞) +w
∫ ∞
0
Eν [D(ξs)]ds+O(w
2).(3.16)
Here, the convention for the function O(w2) is as in Theorem 1. Moreover,
D(ξs) ∈ L1(dPν ⊗ ds).
Proof. It suffices to prove the theorem for ν = δη0 for any η0 ∈ {1,0}V .
Recall that the function p1 defined by (2.6) is harmonic for the voter model,
and hence, the expansion (3.6) applies. By (3.8) and Lemma 3.7, it is plain
that
∞∑
n=2
∑
j∈I(n)
Qw,jjn p1(η0) =O(w
2).(3.17)
We identify each j ∈ I(1) as j= (j) = j and look at the summands Qw,jj p1.
Write Ew,j for the expectation of the time-inhomogeneous Markov chain
where the transition of each step is governed by P except that the transition
from j − 1 to j is governed by Pw. Then
Qw,jj p1(η0) = E
w,j
η0
[p1(ξj)]−Eη0 [p1(ξj)]
= Eη0 [E
w
ξj−1
[p1(ξ1)]− Eξj−1 [p1(ξ1)]]
(3.18)
= Eη0 [K
wp1(ξj−1)]
= Eη0 [K
wp1(ξj−1); τ1 ∧ τ0 ≥ j],
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where the last equality follows from the definition of Kw and the fact that
1 and 0 are both absorbing. Moreover, we deduce from Lemma 3.1 that
Kwp1(η) =
λ
N
wD(η) +
λ
N
w2Gw(η),(3.19)
where
Gw(x, η) = gw(x, η)(1− 2η(x)).
Note that Eη0 [τ1 ∧ τ0]<∞ by Lemma 3.5. Hence, by (3.18) and (3.19), we
deduce that
∞∑
j=1
Qw,jj p1(η0) =
λw
N
∞∑
j=1
Eη0 [D(ξj−1)] +O(w
2)
(3.20)
=wEη0
[∫ ∞
0
D(ξs)ds
]
+O(w2),
where the last equality follows from (3.15). Moreover, D(ξs) ∈L1(dPη0⊗ds).
The approximation (3.16) for each w ≤w2 for some small w2 ∈ (0,w1] now
follows from (3.17) and (3.20) applied to the expansion (3.6) for p1. The
proof is complete. 
4. First-order approximations. In this section, we give the proof of The-
orem 1. We consider only regular graphs throughout this section. (Recall
that a graph is regular if all vertices have the same number of neighbors.)
As a preliminary, let us introduce the convenient notion of Bernoulli trans-
forms and discuss its properties. For each u ∈ [0,1], let µu be the Bernoulli
product measure on {1,0}V with density µu(ξ(x) = 1) = u. For any function
f :{1,0}V −→R, define the Bernoulli transform of f by
Bf(u) :=
∫
f dµu =
N∑
n=0
[ ∑
η:#{x;η(x)=1}=n
f(η)
]
un(1− u)N−n,
(4.1)
u ∈ [0,1].
The Bernoulli transform of f uniquely determines the coefficients
Af (n) :=
∑
η:#{x;η(x)=1}=n
f(η), 0≤ n≤N.
Indeed, Bf(0) = f(0) =Af (0) and for each 1≤ n≤N ,
Af (n) = lim
u↓0+
1
un
(
BI(u)−
n−1∑
i=0
ui(1− u)N−iAf (i)
)
.
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The Bernoulli transform Bf(u) is a polynomial
∑N
i=0αiu
i of order at
most N . Let us invert the coefficients Af (n) from αi by basic combinatorics.
By the binomial theorem,
ui =
N−i∑
n=0
(
N − i
n
)
ui+n(1− u)N−i−n.
Hence, summing over i+ n, we have
N∑
i=0
αiu
i =
N∑
n=0
[
n∑
i=0
αi
(
N − i
n− i
)]
un(1− u)N−n,
and the uniqueness of the coefficients Af implies
Af (n) =
n∑
i=0
αi
(
N − i
n− i
)
, 0≤ n≤N.(4.2)
As a corollary, we obtain∫
f dun =
1(
N
n
)Af (n) = 1(N
n
) n∑
i=0
αi
(
N − i
n− i
)
, 1≤ n≤N − 1,(4.3)
if we regard un, the uniform distribution on the set of configurations with
precisely n many 1’s, as a measure on {1,0}V in the natural way.
We will specialize the application of Bernoulli transforms to the function
I(η) :=
∫ ∞
0
Eη[D(ξs)]ds.
To obtain the explicit approximations (up to the first order) asserted in The-
orem 1, we need to compute by Theorem 3.8 the 0-potentials
∫∞
0 Eun [D(ξs)]ds
for 1≤ n≤N − 1 under each updating mechanism. On the other hand, we
will see that the Bernoulli transform of each 0-potential I is analytically
tractable and
BI(u) = Γu(1− u)(4.4)
for some explicit constant Γ. Note that we have AI(N) =AI(0) = 0 for the
updating mechanisms under consideration. Hence, the formula (4.3) entails∫ ∞
0
Eun [D(ξs)]ds=
Γn(N − n)
N(N − 1) , 1≤ n≤N − 1,(4.5)
since
(
N−1
n−1
)− (N−2
n−2
)
=
(
N−2
n−1
)
for n≥ 2 and (N−10 )= (N−20 )= 1.
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4.1. Proof of Theorem 1(1). Assume that the graph G is k-regular. Re-
call that the death–birth updating defines a Markov chain of voter model
perturbation satisfying (A.1)–(A.4) by Proposition 2.1 under weak selection.
The functions hi in (A.1) for this updating are given by (2.3). Hence, the
difference kernel D is given by D(x, ξ) = h1(x, ξ), and for any x ∈ V,
1
k
Eµu [D(x, ξs)] =−(b+ c)Eµu [f0f1(x, ξs)] + bEµu [f00(x, ξs)]
+ bEµu [f0f11(x, ξs)]− bEµu [f0f00(x, ξs)]
(4.6)
=−(b+ c)Eµu [f0f1(x, ξs)] + bEµu [f0f11(x, ξs)]
+ bEµu [f1f00(x, ξs)].
In analogy to the computations in [6] for coalescing probabilities, we resort
to the duality between voter models and coalescing random walks for the
right-hand side of (4.6). Let {Bx;x ∈ V} be the rate-1 coalescing random
walks on G, where Bx starts at x. The random walks move independently
of each other until they meet another and move together afterward. The
duality between the voter model and the coalescing random walks is given
by
Pη(ξs(x) = ix, x ∈Q) = P(η(Bxs ) = ix, x∈Q)
for any Q⊂ V and (ix;x ∈Q) ∈ {1,0}Q. (See Chapter V in [11].) Introduce
two independent discrete-time random walks (Xn;n ≥ 0) and (Yn;n ≥ 0)
starting at the same vertex, both independent of {Bx;x ∈ V}. Fix x and
assume that the chains (Xn) and (Yn) both start at x. Recall that we write
η̂ ≡ 1− η. Then by duality, we deduce from (4.6) that
1
k
Eµu [D(x, ξs)] =−(b+ c)
∫
µu(dη)E[η̂(B
X1
s )η(B
Y1
s )]
+ b
∫
µu(dη)E[η̂(B
X1
s )η(B
Y1
s )η(B
Y2
s )]
+ b
∫
µu(dη)E[η(B
X1
s )η̂(B
Y1
s )η̂(B
Y2
s )]
=−c
∫
µu(dη)E[η(B
Y1
s )] + c
∫
µu(dη)E[η(B
X1
s )η(B
Y1
s )](4.7)
+ b
∫
µu(dη)E[η(B
Y1
s )η(B
Y2
s )]
− b
∫
µu(dη)E[η(B
X1
s )η(B
Y2
s )]
+ b
∫
µu(dη)E[η(B
X1
s )− η(BY1s )].
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For clarity, let us write from now on Pρ and Eρ for the probability measure
and the expectation, respectively, under which the common initial position
of (Xn) and (Yn) is distributed as ρ. Recall that D(ξ) is the pi-expectation
of x 7−→D(x, ξ) defined by (1.6). Write Mx,y = inf{t ∈R+;Bxt =Byt } for the
first meeting time of the random walks Bx and By, so Bx and By coin-
cide after Mx,y. Then from (4.7), the spatial homogeneity of the Bernoulli
product measures implies that
1
k
Eµu [D(ξs)] =−cu+ c[uPpi(MX1,Y1 ≤ s) + u2Ppi(MX1,Y1 > s)]
+ b[uPpi(MY1,Y2 ≤ s) + u2Ppi(MY1,Y2 > s)]
− b[uPpi(MX1,Y2 ≤ s) + u2Ppi(MX1,Y2 > s)]
=−cu(1− u)Ppi(MX1,Y1 > s)− bu(1− u)Ppi(MY1,Y2 > s)
+ bu(1− u)Ppi(MX1,Y2 > s).
To obtain BI , we integrate both sides of the foregoing equality with respect
to s over R+. This gives
BI(u) = ku(1− u)(−cEpi[MX1,Y1 ]− bEpi[MY1,Y2 ] + bEpi[MX1,Y2 ]).(4.8)
We now turn to a simple identity between first meeting times and first
hitting times. Let Ty = inf{n ≥ 0;Xn = y}, the first hitting time of y by
(Xn). Observe that for the random walks on (connected) regular graphs, the
invariant distribution is uniform and Ex[Ty] = Ey[Tx] for any x, y. Hence,
the proof of Proposition 14.5 in [1] implies
E[Mx,y] =
1
2Ex[Ty], x, y ∈ V.(4.9)
Write
f(x, y) :=Ex[Ty] =Ey[Tx], x, y ∈ V,
where Ex =Eδx .
Lemma 4.1. For any z ∈ V,
Ez[f(X0,X1)] =Ez[f(Y1, Y2)] =N − 1,(4.10)
Ez[f(X1, Y1)] =Ez[f(Y0, Y2)] =N − 2,(4.11)
Ez[f(X1, Y2)] =
(
1 +
1
k
)
(N − 1) + 1
k
− 2.(4.12)
Proof. The proof of the equality Ez[f(X0,X1)] =N − 1 can be found
in Chapter 3 of [1] or [12]. We restate its short proof here for the convenience
of readers. Let T+x = inf{n ≥ 1;Xn = x} denote the first return time to x.
A standard result of Markov chains says Ex[T
+
x ] = pi(x)
−1 =N for any x.
The equalities in (4.10) now follow from the Markov property.
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Next, we prove (4.11). By (4.10) and the symmetry of f , we have
N − 1 =Ez[f(X0,X1)] =
∑
x∼z
1
k
Ez[Tx]
=
∑
x∼z
∑
y∼z
1
k2
(Ey[Tx] + 1) =Ez[f(Y1,X1)] + 1,
so Ez[f(X1, Y1)] =N − 2. Here, our summation notation
∑
x∼z means sum-
ming over indices x with z fixed, and the same convention holds in the proof
of (4.12) and Section 5 below. A similar application of the Markov property
to the coordinate Y1 in Ez[f(Y0, Y1)] gives Ez[f(Y0, Y2)] =N−2. This proves
(4.11).
Finally, we need to prove (4.12). We use (4.10) and (4.11) to get
Ez[f(X0,X1)] = 1+Ez[f(X1, Y1)]
= 1+
∑
x∼z
∑
y∼z
y 6=x
1
k2
Ex[Ty]
= 1+
∑
x∼z
∑
y∼z
y 6=x
1
k2
(∑
w∼y
1
k
Ex[Tw] + 1
)
(4.13)
= 1+
∑
x∼z
∑
y∼z
y 6=x
1
k2
+
∑
x∼z
∑
y∼z
∑
w∼y
1
k3
Ex[Tw]−
∑
x∼z
∑
w∼x
1
k3
Ex[Tw]
= 2− 1
k
+Ez[f(X1, Y2)]− 1
k
Ez[f(X1,X0)].(4.14)
Here, in (4.13) we use the symmetry of f , and the last equality follows from
(4.10). A rearrangement of both sides of (4.14) and an application of (4.10)
then lead to (4.12), and the proof is complete. 
Apply Lemma 4.1 and (4.9) to (4.8), and we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4.2. For any u ∈ [0,1],
BI(u) =
ku(1− u)
2
[(
b
k
− c
)
(N − 2) + b
(
2
k
− 2
)]
.(4.15)
Finally, since BI(u) takes the form (4.4), we may apply (4.5) and Propo-
sition 4.2 to obtain the explicit formula for the coefficient of w in (3.16),
subject to each initial distribution un. This proves our assertion in Theo-
rem 1(1).
4.2. Proof of Theorem 1(2). The proof of Theorem 1(2) follows from
almost the same argument for Theorem 1(1) except for more complicated
arithmetic. For this reason, we will only point out the main steps, leaving the
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detailed arithmetic to the interested readers. In the following, we continue
to use the notation for the random walks in the proof of Theorem 1(1).
Fix x ∈ V and assume the chains (Xn) and (Yn) both start at x. By
Proposition 2.2, we have
1
k
Eµu [D(x, ξs)]
= Eµu [(b− c)ξ̂s(x)f11(x, ξs)− cξ̂s(x)f10(x, ξs)− bξs(x)f01(x, ξs)]
− k
k+ 1
Eµu [((b− c)f11(x, ξs)− cf10(x, ξs) + bf01(x, ξs))
× (ξ̂s(x)f1(x, ξs)− ξs(x)f0(x, ξs))]
− 1
k+ 1
Eµu [bξ̂s(x)f
2
1 (x, ξs)
− ξs(x)f0(x, ξs)((b− c)f1(x, ξs)− cf0(x, ξs))]
=
∫
µu(dη)
(
E[(b− c)η̂(Bxs )η(BY1s )η(BY2s )− cη̂(Bxs )η(BY1s )η̂(BY2s )
− bη(Bxs )η̂(BY1s )η(BY2s )]
− k
k+1
E[((b− c)η(BY1s )η(BY2s )− cη(BY1s )η̂(BY2s )
+ bη̂(BY1s )η(B
Y2
s ))
× (η(BX1s )− η(Bxs ))]
− 1
k+1
E[bη̂(Bxs )η(B
X1
s )η(B
Y1
s )
− (b− c)η(Bxs )η̂(BX1s )η(BY1s )
+ cη(Bxs )η̂(B
X1
s )η̂(B
Y1
s )]
)
,
where the last equality follows again from duality. The last equality gives
1
k
Eµu [D(x, ξs)]
=
∫
µu(dη)E
[
bη(BY1s )η(B
Y2
s ) +
c+ b
k+1
η(Bxs )η(B
Y1
s )
− cη(BY1s )−
b
k+1
η(Bxs )η(B
Y2
s ) +
kc− b
k+1
η(BX1s )η(B
Y1
s )
− kb
k+1
η(BX1s )η(B
Y2
s ) +
c
k+ 1
η(Bxs )η(B
X1
s )
− c
k+ 1
η(Bxs )
]
.
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Recall that X1
(d)
= Y1. Hence, by the definition of D and Ppi, the foregoing
implies that
1
k
Eµu [D(ξs)] =−bu(1− u)Ppi(MY1,Y2 > s)
− 2c+ b
k+1
u(1− u)Ppi(MX0,X1 > s)
+
b
k+1
u(1− u)Ppi(MY0,Y2 > s)
− kc− b
k+ 1
u(1− u)Ppi(MX1,Y1 > s)
+
kb
k+1
u(1− u)Ppi(MX1,Y2 > s).
Again, we integrate both sides of the foregoing display with respect to s and
then apply (4.9) and Lemma 4.1 for the explicit form of BI . The result is
given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. For any u ∈ [0,1],
BI(u) =
k(k +2)u(1− u)
2(k +1)
[(
b
(k+ 2)
− c
)
(N − 1)− (2k +1)b− ck
k+ 2
]
.
Our assertion for Theorem 1(2) now follows from an application of Propo-
sition 4.3 similar to that of Proposition 4.2 for Theorem 1(1). The proof is
now complete.
5. Proofs of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2.
5.1. Proof of Proposition 2.1. Suppose that ξ ∈ {1,0}V is the present
configuration on the graph. Let ni(x) = ni(x, ξ) be the number of neighbor-
ing i players for an individual located at vertex x for i= 1,0. Let w ∈ [0,1]
denote the intensity of selection. By definition, the fitness ρi(x) = ρi(x, ξ) of
an i-player located at x is given by
ρi(x) = (1−w) +w [Πi1 Πi0 ]
[
n1(x)
n0(x)
]
= (1−w) +wΠin(x).(5.1)
Here, Πi is the payoff row of an i-player of the matrix Π and n(x) is the
column vector [n1(x) n0(x)]
⊤. Hence, there exists w0 > 0 depending only on
k and Π such that ρi > 0 for every w ∈ [0,w0] (see [6]).
The game with the death–birth updating under weak selection defines a
Markov chain with transition probabilities Pw taking the form (2.2) and
cw(x, ξ) = r1−ξ(x)(x, ξ)≥ 0,(5.2)
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ri(x, ξ) =
∑
y∼x ρi(y)1ξ(y)=i∑
y∼x[ρ1(y)ξ(y) + ρ0(y)ξ̂(y)]
.(5.3)
It has been shown in Section 1.4 of [6] that the rates cw define voter model
perturbations satisfying (A.1) and (A.2). Moreover, λ= 1 and the functions
hi in the expansion (A.2) are given by (2.3). Plainly, c
w(x,1)≡ r0(x,1)≡ 0
and cw(x,0)≡ r1(x,0)≡ 0. Hence, (A.3) is also satisfied.
It remains to check that (A.4) is satisfied. Since (A.4) is satisfied when
w = 0, it is enough to show that
P (ξ, ξx)> 0 ⇐⇒ Pw(ξ, ξx)> 0(5.4)
for any ξ 6= 1,0 and any x. However, this is immediate from (5.3) if we notice
that ρi(·) and the constant function 1, both regarded as measures on V in
the natural way, are equivalent. Our proof of Proposition 2.1 is complete.
Remark 5.1. Suppose now that payoff is given by a general 2×2 payoff
matrix Π∗ = (Π∗ij)i,j=1,0 subject only to the “equal-gains-from-switching”
condition (1.10). Let us explain how to reduce the games with payoff matrix
Π∗ to the games with payoff matrix Πa under weak selection, where Πa is
defined by (1.11).
In this case, payoffs of players are as described in Remark 1.1, and fitness
is given by
ρΠ
∗
i (x) = (1−w) +wΠ∗in(x), x ∈ V.(5.5)
Here again, Π∗i is the payoff row of an i-player. We put the superscript Π
∗
(only in this remark) to emphasize the dependence on the underlying payoff
matrix Π∗, so, in particular, the previously defined fitness ρ in (5.1) is equal
to ρΠ.
Suppose that the graph is k-regular. The transition probabilities under
the death–birth updating with payoff matrix Π∗ are defined in the same
way as before through (5.2) and (5.3) with ρ replaced by ρΠ
∗
. Note that
n1(x) + n0(x)≡ k. Then for all small w
1
1− (1− kΠ∗00)w
ρΠ
∗
i (x) = 1+
w
1− (1− kΠ∗00)w
Πai n(x)
= 1+
wa
1−waΠ
a
in(x)
=
1
1−wa ρ
Πa
i (x)
for some wa. Here, w and wa are defined continuously in terms of each other
by
wa =
w
1 + kΠ∗00w
and w =
wa
1− kΠ∗00wa
,
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so limwa→0w = limw→0w
a = 0. Consequently, by (5.2) and (5.3), the fore-
going display implies that the death–birth updating with payoff matrix Π∗
and intensity of selection w is “equivalent” to the death–birth updating with
payoff matrix Πa and intensity of selection wa, whenever wa or w is small.
Here, “equivalent” means equality of transition probabilities.
A similar reduction applies to the imitation updating by using its formal
definition described in the next subsection, and we omit the details.
5.2. Proof of Proposition 2.2. Under the imitation updating, the Markov
chain of configurations has transition probabilities given by
Pw(ξ, ξx) =
1
N
dw(x, ξ),
(5.6)
Pw(ξ, ξ) = 1− 1
N
∑
x
dw(x, ξ),
where
dw(x, ξ) = s1−ξ(x)(x, ξ),(5.7)
si(x, ξ) =
∑
y∼x ρi(y)1ξ(y)=i∑
y∼x[ρ1(y)ξ(y) + ρ0(y)ξ̂(y)] + ρ1−i(x)
(5.8)
and the fitness ρi are defined as before by (5.1). We assume again that the
intensity of selection w is small such that ρi > 0. To simplify notation, let
us set the column vectors
f(x) = [f1(x) f0(x) ]
⊤,
fi•(x) = [fi1(x) fi0(x) ]
⊤,
ni•(x) = [ni1(x) ni0(x) ]
⊤,
where the functions fi and fij are defined by (2.4). By (5.1) and (5.8), we
have
si(x, ξ) =
(1−w)ni(x) +wΠini•(x)
(1−w)(k +1) +w∑1j=0Πjnj•(x) +wΠ1−in(x)
=
(1−w)k/(k +1)fi(x) + k2/(k +1)wΠifi•(x)
(1−w) +wk2/(k+ 1)∑1j=0Πjfj•(x) +wk/(k +1)Π1−if(x)
=
k/(k + 1)fi(x) +w(k
2/(k + 1)Πifi•(x)− k/(k + 1)fi(x))
1 +w(k2/(k+ 1)
∑1
j=0Πjfj•(x) + k/(k + 1)Π1−if(x)− 1)
.
Note that the functions fi and fij are uniformly bounded. Apply Taylor’s
expansion in w at 0 to the right-hand side of the foregoing display. We
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deduce from (5.7) that the transition probabilities (5.6) takes the form (2.2)
with λ= k
k+1 and the rates c
w satisfying (A.1) and (A.2) for some small w0.
Moreover, the functions hi are given by
hi = (kΠifi• − fi)− fi
(
k2
k+ 1
1∑
j=0
Πjfj•+
k
k+1
Π1−if − 1
)
= kΠifi• − k
2
k+ 1
fi
(
1∑
j=0
Πjfj•
)
− k
k+ 1
fiΠ1−if .
By the definition of Π in (1.1), we get (2.5). The verifications of (A.3) and
(A.4) follow from similar arguments for those of (A.3) and (A.4) under the
death–birth updating, respectively. This completes the proof of Proposi-
tion 2.2.
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